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What can you say about a thirty-five-year-old casebook that still 
lives? 
That its first edition6 was beautiful and brilliant probably the 
most important and influential casebook ever written. That the first 
edition was nevertheless deeply problematic in its vision of federalism, 
separation of powers, and "cases and controversies." That its newly 
released third edition is better in many respects - more aware (though 
not univocally and uncritically supportive) of a resurgent vision of 
federal courts as irreplaceable guardians of federal constitutional 
rights, and active enforcers of federal constitutional remedies, against 
both state and federal governments. That, in keeping with the case- 
book's underlying vision of legal doctrine, The Federal Courts and the 
Federal System is itself in the process of working its grand themes 
pure. That there thus remains modest room for improvement, and 
good reason to hope that future editions of the casebook will occupy 
at least part of that room. 
That the foregoing statements require more elaboration before they 
should be accepted. 
1 John P. Wilson Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. 
2 Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. 
3 Emmanuel S. Heller Professor of Law, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California 
at Berkeley. 
4 William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. 
5 Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School. B.A., Yale, I980; J.D., Yale, I984. I 
would like to thank Bruce Ackerman, Jan Deutsch, Richard Fallon, Paul Gewirtz, Geof Hazard, 
Burke Marshall, Peter Swire, and Ron Wright for their helpful comments on an early draft of 
this Review. This Review is dedicated to Owen Fiss, who studied federal courts under Henry 
Hart and taught me about them one generation later. 
6 H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (Ist ed. 
1953) [hereinafter First Edition]. 
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I. THE PAST 
As The Federal Courts and the Federal System makes abundantly 
clear, full understanding of contemporary issues of federal jurisdiction 
requires a historical investigation of legal doctrines and legal institu- 
tions. Thus, the book opens with a chapter discussing the historical 
origins of article III and describing the broad contours of major 
jurisdictional statutes from I789 to date (pp. I-64). In subsequent 
chapters, virtually every major doctrinal theme is developed with 
attention to historical lineage and evolution. Similarly, an ideal ac- 
count of the casebook itself should begin with a historical inquiry into 
the book's origins and antecedents. This seems especially apt for a 
book whose new preface opens with the following words: 
Authors of new editions tend to brag about how much there is that 
is new. In contrast, we are particularly pleased that so much of the 
classic First Edition remains alive in this, the Third. We have sought 
to retain the historical and analytical richness of the first two editions, 
as well as their editorial method . . . (p. xxi). 
A. Origins: I953-I954 
When Professors Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler published the 
first edition of their casebook on federal courts in I953, they were 
greeted with a unanimous and near-deafening chorus of accolades 
from the scholarly community. In the pages of this Review, Professor 
Kurland described the book as "the definitive text on the subject of 
federal jurisdiction in spite of its casebook label. It is a text largely 
in the sense that Plato's Socratic dialogues constitute a text."7 Pro- 
fessor Mishkin's words in the University of Chicago Law Review were 
even more glowing. The book, he wrote: 
turns up real gold in its area of law [and] go[es] further, [to] explore 
new veins and present new ways of refining the precious metal .. 
With an inexorable drive toward meticulous and thorough understand- 
ing of their subject, the authors have produced a masterful contribu- 
tion to the literature of the law and of law teaching. 
... [T]he analysis is of an order difficult to match anywhere.8 
7 Kurland, Book Review, 67 HARV. L. REV. 906, 907 (I954). Professor Kurland had served 
earlier as the President of the Harvard Law Review, as had Professor Hart, and as a law clerk 
to Justice Felix Frankfurter, to whom the first edition was dedicated. 
8 Mishkin, Book Review, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 776, 776-78 (I954). Professor Mishkin had 
served earlier as an editor of the Columbia Law Review, on which Professor Wechsler had 
served even earlier as Editor-in-Chief. He subsequently became one of the editors of the second 
and third editions of the casebook. 
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Like "precious metal," The Federal Courts and the Federal System 
radiated a sense of beauty and permanence to its many admirers. 
Professor Barrett's contemporaneous essay in the California Law Re- 
view also used gold metaphors to describe the book,9 and the George- 
town Law Journal declared: 
This is the case-book to end all case-books on the subject; it may 
fairly be said to be the last word; a massive affair, so complete and 
exhaustive, so competently, indeed inspiringly, written as to render 
any new book in this field extremely unlikely for some time to come. 10 
How are we to account for this truly extraordinary reception?" 
Much of the first edition's unique strength derives from its sheer scope. 
The breadth of the issues covered and the depth of historical and 
legal analysis are staggering. The experience of reading the book is 
humbling - all the more so to those who fancy themselves "experts" 
in federal jurisdiction. In almost every chapter, even self-styled ex- 
perts are likely to encounter myriad and important cases, doctrines, 
issues, articles, and arguments that they had not previously known or 
considered. My own initial encounter with the first edition left me 
feeling exactly the way Professor Barrett felt some thirty years before: 
From his first using of the book this reviewer learned how little he 
really knew about the subject. After the tenth time through the book 
he expects still to be learning, still to be wondering what the answers 
are to many of the questions posed by the authors. 12 
By the sheer breadth and depth of their presentation, Professors Hart 
and Wechsler succeeded in defining the pedagogic canon13 of what 
has come to be one of the most important fields of public law in late 
twentieth-century America, variously described in modern law school 
course catalogues as "federal courts" or "federal jurisdiction." 
But The Federal Courts and the Federal System is more than 
simply "the most comprehensive and most thoughtful collection of 
materials relating to the federal courts which have ever been gath- 
9 See Barrett, Book Review, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 202, 203 (I954) ("Most of the text notes are 
pure teacher's gold."). 
10 Hughes, Book Review, 42 GEo. L.J. 488 (I954). 
11 See P. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 43 (i982) ("This extraordinary work is perhaps 
the most influential casebook ever written. It is the book most frequently cited by the Supreme 
Court both generally and in constitutional opinions."). It should be noted that Professor Bobbitt's 
book is itself an extraordinary work that has deeply influenced the general ideas and approach 
of this Review. 
12 Barrett, supra note 9, at 203. 
13 See Resolution of the Faculty, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 947, 949 (I978) (stating that the 
casebook "accomplished the almost unthinkable feat of producing consensus among law teachers 
about materials of pedagogy"). 
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ered."14 As important as the book is bibliographically, it is probably 
even more significant methodologically in defining what has come to 
be one of the most important schools of legal thought in late twentieth- 
century America, typically described as "the legal process school." 
Although the jurisprudential richness of this school resists a simple 
one-line encapsulation and can best be appreciated by immersion in 
the book itself, a rough-and-ready description of the school might read 
something like this. The legal process school focuses primary attention 
on who is, or ought, to make a given legal decision, and how that 
decision is, or ought, to be made. Is, or ought, a particular legal 
question to be resolved by the federal or the state government? By 
courts, legislatures, or executive agencies? If by courts, at the trial 
level or by appellate tribunals? If at trial, by judges or juries? Subject 
to what standard of appellate review? And so on. The question what 
is or ought to be the substantive law governing citizen behavior in a 
given area is no longer the sole, or even the dominant, object of legal 
analysis. Rather, legal process analysis illuminates how substantive 
norms governing primary conduct shape, and are in turn shaped by, 
organizational structure and procedural rules. 
The legal process methodology dovetails nicely with the scope of 
federal jurisdiction as a discrete field of study. Indeed, the method- 
ology seems to have helped set the boundaries of the field as defined 
by Hart and Wechsler - a fact of which the original editors were 
acutely self-conscious: 
The book deals mainly with these problems of federal-state rela- 
tionships but it also has two secondary themes. In varying contexts 
we pose the issue of what courts are good for - and are not good for 
- seeking thus to open up the whole range of questions as to the 
appropriate relationship between the federal courts and other organs 
of federal and state government. We also pose throughout problems 
of the organization and management of the federal courts . . (ist ed. 
p. xii). 
Although the casebook stands as a monumental landmark in fed- 
eral jurisdiction and legal process, it does not stand alone: the general 
issues it posed were at the forefront of legal scholarship in the early 
I950's. Indeed, in retrospect, the years I953 and I954 appear as- 
the metaphor is hard to resist - "the golden age" of federal jurisdic- 
tion and legal process scholarship. Consider, for example, the arrest- 
ing number of now-classic articles and significant student Notes in 
this genre published in those two years by only two law reviews, 
representing Professor Hart's and Professor Wechsler's respective 
schools: 
14 Gardner, Book Review, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 653, 657 (I954). 
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66 Harvard Law Review (1952-I953): 
Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal 
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic15 
Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy16 
Note, The Expansion of Federal Question Jurisdiction to Maritime 
Claims: A New Jurisdictional Theory17 
Note, Supreme Court Review of State Interpretations of Federal 
Law Incorporated by Reference18 
67 Harvard Law Review (I953-1954): 
Hart, Professor Crosskey and Judicial Review (Book Review)19 
Note, The Equitable Remedial Rights Doctrine: Past and Present20 
Note, From Judicial Grant to Legislative Power: The Admiralty 
Clause in the Nineteenth Century2' 
53 Columbia Law Review (1952-1953): 
Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts22 
Note, Clearfield, Clouded Field of the Federal Common Law23 
Note, Effect of the Federal Constitution in Requiring State Post- 
Conviction Remedies24 
Note, Federal Statutes Without Limitations Provisions25 
54 Columbia Law Review (1953-1954): 
Freund, Umpiring the Federal System26 
Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law27 
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism28 
Equally arresting is the number of student editors on the editorial 
boards of the above-listed volumes who went on to become teachers 
of federal jurisdiction, legal process, and constitutional law - yet 
another signal that the era was one of great intellectual ferment at 
15 66 HARV. L. REv. I362 (I953). 
16 66 HARV. L. REv. IOI3 (I953). Professor Hill subsequently received an S.J.D. degree 
from Harvard Law School and an appointment to the Columbia Law School faculty. His I969 
essay in the Columbia Law Review on constitutional remedies was dedicated to the late Professor 
Hart. See Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REv. IIO9 (I969). 
17 66 HARV. L. REv. 315 (I952). 
18 66 HARV. L. REV. I498 (1953). 
19 67 HARV. L. REV. 1456 (I954). 
20 67 HARV. L. REv. 836 (I954). 
21 67 HARV. L. REV. 1214 (I954). 
22 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157 (I953). 
23 53 COLUM. L. REv. 99I (I953). 
24 53 COLUM. L. REV. II43 (Iy53). 
25 53 COLUM. L. REv. 68 (I953). 
26 54 COLUM. L. REv. 56I (1954). Professor Freund was a colleague of Professor Hart on 
the Harvard Law School faculty. Like Professor Hart, he had served earlier as President of 
the Harvard Law Review and had clerked for Justice Brandeis. 
27 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489 (1954). 
28 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954)- 
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Harvard and Columbia under the intellectual leadership of Professors 
Hart and Wechsler.29 
Harvard: 
Phillip E. Areeda (Legal Process) 
Norman Dorsen (Constitutional Law and Legal Process) 
Gerald Gunther (Constitutional Law and Federal Jurisdiction) 
Kenneth L. Karst (Constitutional Law and Federal Courts) 
Andrew Kaufman (Constitutional Law) 
Columbia: 
Lino Graglia (Constitutional Law) 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. (Federal Jurisdiction) 
Yale Kamisar (Constitutional Law) 
Harold Korn (Constitutional Law and Federal Jurisdiction) 
Robert Pitofsky (Federal Jurisdiction) 
B. Antecedents: I938 
The fruition of the legal process school was hardly an overnight 
event. Many of the ideas and perspectives elaborated in "golden age" 
works - most obviously the first edition of the casebook itself - had 
been gestating for years. Nor did the legal process tradition take root 
in an intellectual vacuum. The school was born as a response to the 
legal realist tradition that had gained ascendancy during the first half 
of the twentieth century. 
According to the legal realists, adjudication was not, and could 
never be, wholly mechanical and apolitical. Thus, judges unavoidably 
made law - at least interstitially. Largely in response to the success 
of the realists, the emerging legal process school began to reformulate 
the inquiry. Given that judges unavoidably made substantive law at 
times, what kinds of law could they legitimately make, and when? 
What kinds of legal decisions were better left to other institutional 
and political actors? Even if judicial enforcement of substantive 
29 The subject matter descriptions below are taken from ASS'N OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, 
DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS I987-,988 (I987). To be sure, not all of the scholars listed in 
the text would consider these to be their dominant areas of scholarly concern. Professor Areeda's 
scholarship, for example, has primarily been in antitrust. Yet perhaps the influence of Hart 
and Wechsler is subtly revealed in the fact that even scholars specializing in other fields continue 
to identify themselves as teachers of courses related to the legal process tradition. For a more 
dramatic example of Hart and Wechsler's influence, see the work of Professor Gunther. 
Interestingly, the corresponding volumes of the Yale Law Journal contained virtually no legal 
process scholarship of similarly enduring significance, and so far as I can tell, no one on Yale's 
editorial boards in these years went on to become a legal process scholar. This is not surprising, 
given that the legal process approach was not particularly well represented on the Yale faculty 
in the early I950's. Cf. Kester, Faculty Participation in the Student-Edited Law Review, 35 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. I4 (I986) (discussing the importance of faculty influence on the Harvard Law 
Review). 
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norms of behavior (whether derived from the Constitution, statutes, 
or case law) often required that judges make controversial policy 
choices, could not metanorms of jurisdiction and procedure transcend 
many immediate substantive controversies? Put another way, even if 
people violently disagreed about what the law in a given area was or 
ought to be, might they nevertheless agree that the legal decision in 
that area ought to be made by a given legal institution (for example, 
a federal court) acting under certain specified rules of operation (for 
example, rules of selection, jurisdiction, procedure, and decision)? If 
the quest for a "brooding omnipresence" of substantive norms was 
necessarily misguided, might not a search for a "natural," or at least 
widely acceptable, law of second-order rules of procedure and juris- 
diction yield fruit?30 
On a more political and less abstract level, legal realism fueled 
growing political opposition in the early twentieth century to federal 
court decisions interpreting the Constitution, statutes, and the com- 
mon law in a fashion that generally favored business interests. If, as 
the realists insisted, such decisions often turned on controversial policy 
choices, by what right did unelected federal judges ever displace the 
policy decisions of Congress or of state judges and legislators? Once 
again, the legal process school can be seen as a response to the realists. 
By paying strict attention to second-order rules allocating power be- 
tween federal courts and other institutions, the legal process theorists 
sought to specify with precision the boundaries and purposes of federal 
judicial power. Once these boundaries and purposes were specified, 
federal judicial decisionmaking could be both legitimated and re- 
strained. 
It is undoubtedly simplistic, but nevertheless convenient and illu- 
minating, to assign the legal process school a precise birthdate: April 
25, I938. On that day, the Supreme Court decided a case that, more 
than any other, appears to have shaped the agenda and analysis of 
the legal process school over the next sixteen years; a case that, even 
in the third edition of Hart & Wechsler, remains the most cited (p. 
lx); a case that John Hart Ely has described as having "mythic" 
proportions31- Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.32 
Until it reached the Supreme Court, Erie was seen as a case about 
a question of substantive law - namely, what duty of care a railroad 
30 [A]s a true disciple of Justice Brandeis, [Henry Hart] saw the integrity and fitness of 
the legal process as a kind of transcendent natural law, a law above laws, standing as 
the scientific process does to the mutable body of science itself, and reminding us that 
there is indeed a morality of morality. 
Freund, Henry M. Hart, Jr.: In Memoriam, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1595, 1596 (I969). 
31 See Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 693 (I974). 
32 304 U.S. 64 (I938). 
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owed to a pedestrian on its right-of-way along and near the rails. But 
on certiorari, the Supreme Court recast the case. The real issue, 
according to the Court's legal process reconceptualization, was not 
one of substantive tort law, but one of the appropriate role of federal 
courts in relation to both Congress and state courts. Precisely because 
the realists had shown that the common law of tort had to be made, 
not found, and because the Progressives and New Dealers had dem- 
onstrated that the particular choices made by federal judges in com- 
mon law tort cases were politically controversial, the Court in Erie 
asked whether federal judges ought to be in the business of fashioning 
a general federal common law. 
The Erie Court's answer to this question can also be seen as 
influenced by legal realism. If common law decisions penned by state 
judges represented state policy just as much as statutes written by 
state legislators, then it made little sense for federal judges to defer 
to the latter, but not the former. Indeed, Professor Hart later wrote 
that this argument was Erie's "essential rationale."33 
At the same time, Erie illustrated how legal process theory might 
help blunt the legal realist charge of result-oriented jurisprudence. By 
focusing on second-order rules of power allocation, Justice Brandeis 
could write a "principled" decision in Erie whose immediate result 
denial of recovery to a sympathetic plaintiff against a Goliath railroad 
- probably ran counter to the Justice's general inclination against big 
business. Of course, over the general run of cases, Justice Brandeis 
may well have believed that the second-order rule announced in Erie 
might incline federal courts to treat big business more strictly, for 
those courts would be bound by the predictably more populist deci- 
sions of state judges less sympathetic to corporate America.34 Legal 
process rules were not always "neutral" in an outcome-indifferent sense 
- process, of course, has a substance of its own35- but faithful 
adherence to these rules did hold out the promise of restraining ad 
hoc judicial decisionmaking. This theme of "principled" decisionmak- 
ing transcending the immediate outcome of the case at bar would, of 
course, pervade later writings of Professors Hart and Wechsler.36 
33 Hart, supra note 27, at 512; see also Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 ("[W]hether the law of the State 
shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a 
matter of federal concern."). 
34 Cf. H. FINK & M. TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: POLICY AND PRACTICE 179, I90 
(2d ed. I987) (suggesting that state judges, being less insulated from the political process, tended 
to be less favorable to corporate concerns than did federal judges in the early twentieth century). 
35 See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST I00 (I980); Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of 
Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. I063 (I980). 
36 See, e.g., Hart, supra note 27, at 534 n.I79; Hart, The Supreme Court, r958 Term- 
Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REv. 84 (I959); Wechsler, Toward 
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. I (I959). 
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C. Problems37 
A case as rich as Erie can be read in many ways; it is thus 
important to see how the main thrust of legal process thinking over 
the next generation invoked Erie as a case about federal judicial 
restraint in relation to state courts, Congress, and parties to lawsuits. 
The legal process school's image of federal courts was an exceedingly 
modest one, portraying the article III judiciary as fungible with state 
courts, wholly dependent on Congress for its subject matter jurisdic- 
tion, and incapable of doing more than passively resolving traditional 
disputes framed by private parties. Yet this reading of Erie was not 
ineluctable. Indeed, from another perspective, Erie can be seen as 
inviting a much broader vision of federalism, separation of powers, 
and "cases and controversies- a vision emphasizing the right and 
responsibility of federal judges to act as unique and active expositers 
of federal law. 
i. Federalism. - Consider first the relationship between state and 
federal courts. In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,38 Justice Frankfurter 
-to whom the first edition of Hart & Wechsler was dedicated 
invoked Erie for the proposition that "a federal court adjudicating a 
State-created right . . . is . . .,in effect, only another court of the 
state."39 Although Professors Hart and Wechsler were not uncritical 
of Justice Frankfurter's opinion in York,40 their own writings were 
curiously infected with a similar willingness to equate state and federal 
courts. Thus, Professor Hart's celebrated Dialogue4l treats state 
courts as fungible with federal courts in enforcing federal rights. In 
Hart's view, although the Constitution requires that some court be 
open to hear all claims involving federal constitutional rights, Con- 
gress has broad authority to decide whether that court will be state 
or federal.42 If Congress can give state courts the last word over 
many cases arising under the federal Constitution, it presumably fol- 
lows a fortiori that Congress can also do so in many cases arising 
under federal statutes and treaties. Professor Wechsler's writings are 
37 My analysis in this section has been influenced by the pioneering work of my colleague 
Jan Deutsch. See, e.g., Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Inter- 
sections Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REv. i69 (I968); Deutsch, Precedent 
and Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. I553 (I974). 
38 326 U.S. 99 (I945). 
39 Id. at io8. 
40 See, e.g., First Edition, supra note 6, at 65o-6o; Hart, supra note 27, at 512 & n.76. 
41 See First Edition, supra note 6, at 3I7-40. 
42 See id. at 317-i8, 339-40. The only limitation on congressional power suggested by 
Professor Hart is that exceptions to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction must not destroy 
the "essential role" of the Court - a role that Hart nowhere defines with any precision. See 
generally Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of-Federal 
Jurisdiction, 65 B.U.L. REv. 205, 215-I6, 220-29 (I985) (discussing the Dialogue and elabo- 
rations thereon by later scholars). 
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even more explicit in affirming virtually plenary congressional power 
to vest state courts with the last word on federal rights.43 In effect, 
both authors adopt the York-like thesis that "a [state] court adjudi- 
cating a [federally] created right is only another court of the [federal 
government]." 
Yet this view masks vital differences between state and federal 
courts - differences that any satisfactory legal process theory must 
take into account. As Professor Hazard notes: 
Trying to assimilate the federal courts to state courts is in any case 
impossible and therefore quixotic, even if we look at it in terms of 
"legal rules," as [justice Frankfurter's opinion in] Guaranty put the 
question. If we look at the legal rules as a whole, and not simply 
those to be seen through an inverted telescope, we find that: 
Federal judges have life tenure, while most state judges do not, 
a condition that is the product of legal rules. 
- Federal judges are appointed by the President of the United 
States, and confirmed by the United States Senate, and have a com- 
mission to prove it, status characteristics that state judges do not have 
and which are created by legal rules. 
Federal judges are elected by a multi-filter, relatively visible, 
ultimately high level appointive process, a basis of investiture not 
enjoyed by most state judges, who are chosen through low visibility 
nomination and nearly invisible election, except where their selection 
is by political election - selection systems that are founded on legal 
rules. 
- Federal judges are part of the United States Government[,] 
. . .an entire institutional matrix that is the creature of legal rules.44 
I have argued elsewhere that the structural superiority of federal 
courts in federal question cases is strongly supported by the text, 
history, and structure of article III.45 But even more, it is also sup- 
ported by Erie itself - although admittedly a different reading of 
Erie than that which prevailed through "the golden age." This reading 
emphasizes Erie's implications for federal judicial responsibility rather 
than federal judicial restraint: if Erie says that state courts are the 
unique and definitive expounders of state law, why isn't the most 
plausible corollary that federal courts are the unique and definitive 
expounders of federal law?46 
43 See, e.g., Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1001, 1005-06 
(i 965). 
44 Hazard, Reflections on the Substance of Finality, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 642, 646-47 
(I985). Professor Hazard had earlier served as an editor of Volumes 53 and 54 of the Columbia 
Law Review, and as a research assistant to Professor Wechsler. 
45 See generally Amar, supra note 42. 
46 For a further explanation of this view, see Friendly, In Praise of Erie - And of the New 
Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 407 (I964). Judge Friendly wrote: 
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2. Separation of Powers. - To this question, Hart and Wechsler 
answered that federal courts could be unique and definitive, but only 
if Congress so desired. Thus, for the original editors, the modest role 
of federal courts vis-a-vis state courts was related to their modest role 
vis-a-vis Congress. 
This modest image of the federal judiciary does have some support 
in Erie. As Professor Mishkin has argued, Congress probably could 
have legislated the tort law rule of decision implicated by the facts of 
Erie under its general power to regulate railroads engaged in traffic 
affecting interstate commerce.47 Erie therefore implies that the power 
of Congress to displace state tort law does not suggest that federal 
courts enjoy a corresponding power absent congressional authoriza- 
tion. To support this reading of Erie, Professor Mishkin appealed to 
Professor Wechsler's analysis of "the political safeguards of federal- 
ism,"48 which emphasized the ways in which the political branches of 
the federal government are constitutionally structured to be attentive 
to states' rights and interests.49 Unsurprisingly, Professor Wechsler 
used this set of structural linkages to argue for judicial restraint: 
federal courts should hesitate to invalidate congressional statutes in 
the name of states' rights, because those rights are well protected by 
the internal structure of the political branches.50 
Once again, however, it is possible to offer a different reading of 
Erie and the constitutional structure - a reading stressing not federal 
judicial restraint, but rather federal judicial responsibility to enforce 
constitutional norms. Justice Brandeis' opinion for the Court in Erie 
declared that Congress was "without power to enact as statutes" rules 
of decision for all diversity cases in federal courts.51 Although Pro- 
fessor Mishkin is correct in implying that this statement was not 
necessary to decide Erie on its facts, Judge Friendly was equally 
correct in insisting that this language was part of the ratio decidendi 
By focusing judicial attention on the nature of the right being enforced, Erie caused the 
principle of a specialized federal common law, binding on all courts because of its source, 
to develop within a quarter century into a powerful unifying force.. . A psychiatrist 
might say that, having rid itself of subconscious feelings of guilt for federal poaching on 
state preserves, the Supreme Court became freer to insist on deference to federal decisions 
by the states where deference was due. 
Id. 
47 See Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie - The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REv. i682 
(I974) [hereinafter Mishkin, The Thread]; Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Compe- 
tence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, I05 U. PA. L. 
REV. 797, 8oo-oi, 814 n.64 (I957) [hereinafter Mishkin, Variousness]. 
48 See Mishkin, The Thread, supra note 47, at i685 & n.I3; Mishkin, Variousness, supra 
note 47, at 800 n.i2. 
49 See generally Wechsler, supra note 28. 
50 See id. at 558-6o. 
51 See 304 U.S. at 72; see also id. at 78 ("Congress has no power to declare substantive rules 
of common law applicable in a State ...."). 
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of Erie.52 Although Erie could have been decided on the narrower 
grounds suggested by Professor Mishkin, it was not. 
Thus, the Erie Court held, inter alia, that the diversity and nec- 
essary and proper clauses, standing alone, would not authorize Con- 
gress to pass a statute displacing all substantive state law in diversity 
cases.53 Presumably, such congressional legislation would violate 
states' rights guaranteed by the tenth amendment. So read, Erie 
stands as a precedent in tension with, rather than supportive of, 
Professor Wechsler's plea for federal judicial restraint in enforcing 
federalism-based constitutional limits against Congress. When care- 
fully examined, Erie's particular line of argument thus offers a sur- 
prisingly vivid image of the federal judiciary as a guardian of rights 
against, and not a servant of, Congress. 
This image becomes all the more clear when one turns from Erie 
to the Constitution itself. Far from giving Congress plenary discretion 
to decide whether state or federal courts are to have the last word on 
the meaning of federal rights, the Constitution declares that "the 
judicial power of the United States shall [that is, 'must'] be vested" 
in the article III judiciary, and "shall [again, 'must'] extend to all 
cases arising under" federal law.54 This language suggests that federal 
judicial power is equal and coordinate, not subordinate, to Congress' 
federal legislative powers. Jurisdiction is vested by the Constitution 
itself, and congressional power to modify that jurisdiction is plainly 
bounded by the mandatory language of "shall" and "all." Nor do 
Professor Wechsler's observations about the constitutional structure of 
Congress give us good reason to ignore these clear textual mandates 
against Congress.55 At most, "the political safeguards of federalism" 
justify judicial restraint when alleged states' rights are at stake; the 
"safeguards" do not argue for restraint when other claims of consti- 
tutional right - for example, individual rights protected under various 
clauses in the first eight amendments -are implicated.56 
Indeed, whether or not Professor Wechsler is aware of the tension, 
his own arguments about political safeguards furnish strong affirma- 
52 See Friendly, supra note 46, at 385, 392-98. Like Professor Hart, Judge Friendly had 
been taught by then-Professor Frankfurter, had served as President of the Harvard Law Review, 
and had clerked for Justice Brandeis. The third edition is dedicated to the late Judge Friendly. 
53 See id.; see also Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1472 n.197 
(I987) (discussing Erie's holding). 
54 U.S. CONST. art. III, ?? 1-2. 
55 I recognize that my claims here - that article III "plainly" and "clear[ly]" mandates that 
some federal court be open, at least on appeal, to resolve any given federal question case finally 
- are controversial ones. For an attempt to defend these claims in much greater detail than 
is possible here, see Amar, cited above in note 42. 
56 Professor Wechsler is well aware of this. See Wechsler, supra note 28, at 56o n.sg. But 
see infra note 96. 
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tive reasons to reject the Hart-Wechsler position that Congress may 
give state courts the last word on federal constitutional rights.57 Pre- 
cisely because of the myriad structural linkages between state govern- 
ments and Congress (all beautifully illustrated by Wechsler) and the 
equally evident role of state courts as part of, and intimately linked 
to the rest of, state government (emphasized by Professor Hart's anal- 
ysis of Erie),58 it makes little sense to view Congress as an adequate 
guardian against state constitutional violations, or to view state courts 
as adequate guardians against congressional violations. To put the 
point in language that Hart and Wechsler deploy with great skill 
elsewhere in their book, the Framers did not trust Congress with the 
power to shift final jurisdiction in federal question cases to state courts 
because the interests of Congress and those courts were not sufficiently 
"adverse":59 both were likely to be too dependent on state legislatures 
and on temporary or parochial majorities. Yet a number of vital 
constitutional rights, in article I, section io were directed against state 
legislatures, state majorities, and the entities dependent on them, 
including state courts.60 Hence, the Framers decided to commit final 
resolution of all constitutional cases to federal judges free of the 
political webs connecting Congress, state legislatures, state courts, and 
temporary parochial majorities.61 
3. Cases and Controversies. Yet if Hart and Wechsler's vision 
was one of judicial modesty, it certainly was not one of judicial 
abdication. Indeed, when Professor Crosskey62 and Judge Hand63 
each challenged the doctrine of judicial review in, the mid-fifties, each 
editor responded with his own eloquent and spirited defense of the 
57 See Amar, supra note 42, at 222-29, 250 (relying on the same political safeguards noted 
by Professor Wechsler to argue against his view of virtually plenary congressional power over 
federal jurisdiction). 
58 See supra p. 695. 
59 See, e.g., First Edition, supra note 6, at 78. 
60 Although the most important set of individual rights against state governments today is 
found in the Reconstruction amendments, these amendments represent a continuation of - and 
not a break with - the animating spirit of the original Constitution. The self-executing 
restrictions on states imposed by article I, section io, preventing state legislatures from passing 
bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, were considered by the Federalists as among the most 
important clauses of the original Constitution. See infra p. 708. 
61 For a more careful attempt to develop this argument, see Amar, cited above in note 42, 
at 222-29. Although federal judges are appointed by the political branches of the federal 
government, "the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department 
must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them." THE FEDERALIST 
No. 51, at 347 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 196I). 
62 See 2 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES 1007 (1953) ("lJ]udicial review was not meant to be provided generally in the Consti- 
tution, as to acts of Congress."). 
63 See L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1-30 (1958). 
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doctrine. 64 At first, these defenses might seem inconsistent with the 
Hart-Wechsler view in the jurisdiction-stripping context that federal 
courts do not occupy an irreplaceable role as guardians of federal 
constitutional rights. Yet the two positions are reconcilable by em- 
phasizing the distinctions between action and inaction, and between 
malfeasance and nonfeasance. Even if Congress need not confer fed- 
eral jurisdiction over a given constitutional case at all, once a federal 
court is seized of jurisdiction it can only decide the case according to 
law. Federal courts therefore must be free to disregard even a congres- 
sional statute if they deem that statute inconsistent with the higher 
legal commands of the Constitution.65 
According to the editors, it was better - and permissible, if 
Congress so desired - for federal courts to say nothing at all than 
for them to say something lawless or unprincipled. This was a theme 
to which Professor Wechsler returned in his famous Holmes Lecture 
on "Neutral Principles,"66 published in the November I959 Harvard 
Law Review, and one that Professor Hart underscored in his own 
Foreword in the same issue, in which he argued that the Supreme 
Court should decide far fewer cases each term and spend more time 
hammering out a principled opinion in each case.67 Indeed, Hart 
would later dramatize his personal commitment to the maxim "if you 
can't say something principled, then don't say anything-at all" with a 
poignant finale to his own Holmes Lectures, delivered in I963. In 
the middle of the period allotted for his final lecture, he confessed to 
the audience his inability to find a principled and satisfactory solution 
to the problem he had posed for himself. And then he sat down.68 
Thus, both Hart and Wechsler synthesized a defense of Congress 
against federal courts in the jurisdiction-stripping debate with an even 
stronger defense of federal courts against Congress in the debate over 
judicial review. The key to this synthesis lay in their emphasis on 
the notion of "case or controversy"; judicial review was presented as 
simply the incidental by-product of deciding properly framed private 
law disputes that Congress chose to assign to the federal courts. It is 
thus not surprising that Hart and Wechsler devoted the first doctrinal 
chapter of their casebook to an elaboration of myriad subdoctrines of 
64 See Hart, supra note I9 (responding to Crosskey); Wechsler, supra note 36, at 2-1O 
(responding to Hand). 
65 See Hart, supra note I5, at 1372, 1378-79, I402; Hart, supra note I9, at I457; Wechsler, 
supra note 36, at 6. 
66 See Wechsler, supra note 36. 
67 See Hart, supra note 36. 
68 For dramatic recountings of this event, see P. BOBBITT, cited above in note ii, at 55- 
5 7, and Bok, Professor Henry Melvin Hart, Jr., 82 HARV. L. REV. 159 I, I592 (I 969). Professor 
Hart's Holmes Lectures were never published. 
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"cases and controversies" -finality, ripeness, mootness, standing, 
justiciability, and so forth -or that it is in this chapter that Marbury 
v. Madison69 appears. 
Once again, Erie can be marshalled in support of this vision of 
the federal judicial function; the Court's constitutional discussion oc- 
curred in the context of deciding a classic private law dispute. Yet 
here too, Erie can be read in a rather different way that emphasizes 
the responsibility of federal courts to declare federal norms rather than 
merely to resolve disputes. To begin with, the Court need not have 
heard the case at all, but chose to through the discretionary writ of 
certiorari. There is an important difference between a Supreme Court 
decision invalidating an act of Congress when the Court has no other 
choice - because it is legally obliged to hear a given case - and an 
otherwise similar invalidation that occurs because the Court has ex- 
ercised its discretion to reach out and opine on an issue. Such dis- 
cretion enables the Court to act affirmatively, rather than wait pas- 
sively, to decide on which areas of law to expound. Even more 
significantly, the Erie Court overruled a century-old line of cases and 
decided major questions of constitutional law despite the fact that 
those questions were not briefed by either party and were not even 
presented in the railroad's certiorari petition.70 In essence, the Court 
reached out to expound public norms in a manner that went far 
beyond the way in which the parties had framed their dispute. To- 
gether, these facts suggest an image of Supreme Court judicial review 
as more than merely the unavoidable side effect of deciding private 
law disputes. 
D. Alternatives 
But surely to say all this - to suggest an image of the federal 
courts as structurally superior to state courts on matters of federal 
law, as equal and coordinate to Congress, and as active expounders 
of public norms rather than passive resolvers of disputes - is to play 
Hamlet without the Prince. For during "the golden age" of the legal 
process school, the Supreme Court decided a case that embodied this 
vision far more than Erie itself; a case that would in fact supplant 
Erie as the dominant case shaping the outlook and agenda of the next 
69 5 U.S. (i Cranch) I37 (i803). Marbury is of course a distinctly double-edged case for 
Hart and Wechsler. Although the opinion does contain language presenting judicial review as 
simply the incidental by-product of deciding particular cases, see id. at I77-78, many of the 
constitutional questions addressed by the Marbury Court were obviously unnecessary to decide 
the case. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I2 (i ith ed. i985); cf. infra text accom- 
panying notes 70, 76, I38 & I52 (critiquing the narrow dispute-resolution model of article III 
adjudication.). 
70 See H. FINK & M. TUSHNET, supra note 34, at I87-88; Friendly, supra note 46, at 399 
n. 7I. 
i989] BOOK REVIEW 703 
generation of legal scholars; a case that Professors Hart and Wechsler 
never fully succeeded in coming to grips with7l - Brown v. Board 
of Education. 72 
Brown called into question every central tenet of the legal process 
theory embodied in the first edition of The Federal Courts and the 
Federal System. As a matter of federalism, Brown and its progeny 
dramatized the obvious lack of fungibility between state and federal 
courts; profound differences in methods of selection, tenure of office, 
and institutional mindset gave lie to the "myth of parity"73 implied, 
however subtly and perhaps unconsciously, by the Hart-Wechsler line 
in the jurisdiction-stripping debate. As a matter of separation of 
powers, the civil rights cases exemplified the federal judiciary's equal 
and coordinate role within the national government. Despite powerful 
voices calling for judicial restraint until Congress acted pursuant to 
its powers under section five of the fourteenth amendment74 - an 
argument that can be seen as a variant of the Mishkin argument 
outside the Erie context75 - federal courts forged ahead and policed 
state compliance with the self-executing provisions of section one. 
Finally, as a matter of "case or controversy," Brown and later cases 
looked extraordinarily different, at both the rights-declaration and 
remedial phases, from the traditional bipolar law disputes paradig- 
matic of "'the business of the Colonial courts and the courts of West- 
minster when the Constitution was framed."'76 Brown itself, for ex- 
ample, did not arise when a single black student refused to vacate 
71 See, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 36, at 31-35 (questioning Brown). Is it possible that 
Professor Hart's other major collaboration never got off the ground because Hart's underlying 
vision was partially mooted by Brown before the book ever reached the final stages of publi- 
cation? Perhaps the title says it all: H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems 
in the Making and Application of Law (tent. ed. I958) (emphasis added). It is also perhaps 
revealing that Professor Hart never succeeded in revising the first edition of The Federal Courts 
and the Federal System in response to Brown and other landmark Warren Court opinions. 
Like Hart, Professor Sacks had served as the President of the Harvard Law Review. Before 
joining the Harvard Law faculty as a colleague of Hart, Sacks clerked for Justice Frankfurter. 
72 347 U.S. 483 (I954). 
73 This phrase derives from Professor Neuborne's superb essay, The Myth of Parity, go 
HARV. L. REv. 1105 (I977). 
74 Cf. L. HAND, supra note 63, at 55 (labeling as "curious" the Brown Court's failure to 
address the section five issue). 
75 See supra p. 698. 
76 First Edition, supra note 6, at I74 (quoting Justice Frankfurter). Although Professors 
Hart and Wechsler are not uncritical of this formulation, the very attention they devote to this 
and similar formulations, and the entire structure of their second chapter, which collects various 
subdoctrines under the heading of "cases and controversies," have, I believe, led to utterly 
mystifying and misguided thinking about standing. The proper test for whether a "case" exists 
is not historical, procedural, or prudential, but substantive: does some substantive law in 
existence today - not 200 years ago - give this plaintiff a cause of action against this defendant? 
See infra note 154. 
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her desk in an all-white classroom, simply raising the equal protection 
clause as a defense in a subsequent trespass action. Rather, it involved 
multiple class actions seeking "affirmative" injunctive relief relief 
that would not simply restore the status quo ante, but would lead to 
a new status quo that had never before existed, namely, integrated 
public schools. Brown influenced not simply the form of adjudication, 
but its very meaning. Indeed, within only a few years the need to 
implement Brown led the Court in Cooper v. Aaron77 to give voice to 
the broadest conception of Supreme Court judicial review it had ever 
articulated, a conception that saw Supreme Court review as the very 
embodiment of the Constitution's meaning rather than a means of 
resolving private disputes.78 
In retrospect, the paucity of discussion in the "golden age" law 
reviews cited above of the segregation cases then pending is perhaps 
even more arresting than the breadth and depth of legal process 
scholarship in those volumes. From November I952 to June I954, 
the Harvard Law Review discussed segregation in only one Note - 
on The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Acts79 - and a single article 
by Dean Leflar and Professor Wylie Davis on Segregation in the 
Public Schools.80 The Columbia Law Review published virtually 
nothing on point; even its I954 symposium on federalism, which 
included articles by Professors Hart, Wechsler, and Freund and 
spanned almost one hundred pages, contains only a single passing 
reference to the momentous issues of federalism then awaiting reso- 
lution in the segregation cases.81 
Indeed, several of the most important arguments set forth by legal 
process theorists in the "golden age" seem rather implausible in light 
of Brown. Consider again, for example, the triumphant finale to 
Hart's Dialogue, which proclaims that state courts are "the primary 
guarantors of constitutional rights, and in many cases they may be 
the ultimate ones."82 Even if this argument makes some sense if one 
thinks only of constitutional rights against the federal government,83 
doesn't it simply overlook the structural inadequacies of state courts 
7 358 U.S. I (I958). 
78 See id. at i8 (equating Supreme Court interpretation of the Constitution with "the supreme 
Law of the Land"). But see Note, The Senate and the Constitution, 97 YALE L.J. iiii (i988) 
(critiquing Coopers overbroad dicta regarding the meaning of Supreme Court review). 
79 66 HARV. L. REV. I285 (I953). Two other Notes in these years may have been written 
in possible (though unarticulated) anticipation of state court resistance to Brown. See Note, 
Evasion of Supreme Court Mandates in Cases Remanded to State Courts Since 1941, 67 HARV. 
L. REV. I25I (I954); Note, Judge Spencer Roane of Virginia: Champion of States' Rights 
Foe of John Marshall, 66 HARV. L. REV. I242 (953). 
80 67 HARV. L. REV. 377 (I954). 
81 See Freund, supra note 26, at 564. 
82 Hart, supra note I5, at I40I. 
83 But see Amar, supra note 42, at 224-28. 
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as "guarantors of constitutional rights" against states in cases like 
Brown?84 
Consider also Professor Hart's language in his I954 Article on The 
Relations Between State and Federal Law85 in which he supports his 
distinctive vision of federalism by invoking, first, a Taney Court case 
about extradition and, second, the eleventh amendment: 
Federal law often says to the states, "Don't do any of these things," 
leaving outside the scope of its prohibition a wide range of alternative 
courses of action. But it is illuminating to observe how rarely it says, 
"Do this thing," leaving no choice but to go ahead and do it.... 
. . . "And we think it clear," said Chief Justice Taney in [Kentucky 
v. Dennison86], "that the Federal Government, under the Constitution, 
has no power to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, 
and compel him to perform it." Taney's statement can stand today, 
[with a few exceptions that do] little to bring into question the principle 
of the rule.... 
... Lower federal courts may prohibit state officers, in their in- 
dividual capacity, from taking action under color of office in violation 
of law. But an action to compel the performance of an affirmative 
act would encounter, ordinarily, the bar of the Eleventh Amend- 
ment. 87 
When I first read these words several years ago, I wrote in the margin, 
"Given Brown, this makes little sense!" That was basically the same 
sentiment the Supreme Court expressed two Terms ago in Puerto Rico 
v. Branstad,88 which overruled Dennison and explicitly relied on both 
Brown and Cooper.89 One can only hope the Court shows similarly 
sound constitutional judgment this Term in the pending Union Gas 
case,90 which affords the Court a happy chance to undo much of the 
mischief done by its earlier eleventh amendment decisions that Hart 
84 See Hart, supra note I5, at I396. Indeed, the Dialogue's failure to attend centrally to 
constitutional rights against states was subtly suggested a few pages earlier, when Professor 
Hart tellingly failed to mention 28 U.S.C. ? I343 as a "general grant[] of jurisdiction." Id. 
Unlike ? I33I, which Professor Hart mentioned, ? I343 specifically focuses on constitutional 
rights against states. Both jurisdictional statutes date to the Reconstruction. Hart's failure to 
mention ? I343 is all the more telling because that section had no minimum dollar limit, and 
thus filled the "principle hole" Hart identified in ? I33I. See id. 
85 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489 (954). 
86 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (i86i). 
87 Hart, supra note 27, at 5I5-i6. 
88 I07 S. Ct. 2802 (I987). 
89 See id. at 2808. Interestingly, the editors of the third edition describe Dennison as a 
sport, limited by the "extraordinary circumstances" surrounding the case (p. ii9i n. i). Compare 
this with Professor Hart's invocation of the case as a cornerstone of American federalism. See 
supra text accompanying note 87. 
90 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d I343 (3d Cir. I987), cert. granted, io8 S. Ct. 
I2 I9 (I988). 
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relied upon in the passage cited above.91 In the wake of Brown, Hans 
v. Louisiana92 and its progeny are no less derelict than was Dennison. 
But even before Brown, Dennison and Hans were derelict cases, 
faithless to the deep structure of both the original Constitution and 
the Reconstruction amendments; even had the segregation cases not 
been looming on the horizon as the first edition went to press, Pro- 
fessors Hart and Wechsler should have been more aware of the prob- 
lematic nature of their vision of federal courts. Brown, after all, only 
revived the Reconstruction amendments; it did not invent them. Even 
if one were to look only at case law, the seeds of Brown were evident 
throughout the period from I938 to I954 in the burgeoning doctrine 
of selective incorporation93 and in a dramatic series of civil rights 
cases orchestrated by the NAACP.94 Indeed, on the very same day 
that Justice Brandeis (for whom Hart had clerked) wrote the Court's 
opinion in Erie, Justice Stone (for whom Wechsler had clerked) 
handed down the Court's opinion in United States v. Carolene Pro- 
ducts Co.,95 whose now-famous footnote four clearly foreshadowed 
both increasing incorporation and the outcome of the segregation 
cases. Nowhere cited in the first edition, Carolene Products and its 
footnote held out a vision of federal courts as irreplaceable structural 
guardians of certain constitutional rights against both Congress and 
the states.96 
91 The Union Gas case presents the Court with a clear chance to hold that, contrary to 
Professor Hart's assumptions, the eleventh amendment simply does not apply to federal question 
cases - and therefore in no way bars federal courts from ordering affirmative relief against 
states on the basis of federal law. For a general discussion of the eleventh amendment, see 
Amar, cited above in note 53, at I466-92. 
92 I34 U.S. i (I890) (holding that principles of sovereign immunity underlying the eleventh 
amendment oust federal jurisdiction even when the plaintiff's claim against the state arises out 
of an alleged constitutional violation by the state). Hans has been widely and devastatingly 
denounced by legal scholars in recent years. The third edition contains a good general discussion 
(pp. II59-22I). 
93 See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 3Io U.S. 296 (I940) (incorporating the free exercise 
clause); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I (I947) (incorporating the establishment clause); 
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-I23 (I947) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing for "total 
incorporation"). Selective incorporation, of course, began even before I938. See Chicago, B. 
& Q. R.R. v. City of Chicago, i66 U.S. 226 (i897) (incorporating the takings clause); Fiske v. 
Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (I927) (incorporating the speech and press clauses). 
94 See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (I938); Sipuel v. Board of 
Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 63I (I948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (I950); 
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (I950). 
95 304 U.S. I44 (I938). 
96 See id. at I52 n.4. Professor Wechsler did cite footnote four at the very end of his essay 
on political safeguards. See Wechsler, supra note 28, at 560 n.59. Yet, although he recognized 
that the footnote's affirmation of the role of federal courts in protecting individual rights 
powerfully undercut the argument for congressional supremacy in the debate over judicial 
review, he apparently failed to see the footnote's parallel implications against congressional 
supremacy in the debate about jurisdiction-stripping. 
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Like Erie, Carolene Products can be assimilated into the legal 
process tradition: like the first edition of Hart & Wechsler, footnote 
four sought to say "what [federal] courts are good for" and the rest of 
the opinion sought to say what they were "not good for" (ist ed. p. 
xii). Indeed, it is probably not coincidental that the two most prom- 
inent works of Dean Ely, perhaps the leading process theorist of the 
generation following Hart and Wechsler, are elaborations of Erie and 
Carolene Products, respectively.97 
- Footnote four, however, conjures up a rather different image of 
federal courts than that suggested by much of the "golden age" schol- 
arship. According to this vision, the role of federal courts is not 
simply - in Paul Freund's words - to "umpir[e] the federal sys- 
tem,"98 but is also to protect individuals against government. How- 
ever subtly, Freund's phrase suggests that the role of the federal courts 
is merely to draw boundaries between Congress and the states and 
among the separate states in order to prevent excessive nationalism 
or parochialism. By contrast, the vision of footnote four more 
properly suggests (i) that there are certain powers that neither Con- 
gress nor the states should have -- such as the power to pass a bill 
of attainder;99 (2) that federal courts have a unique structural role to 
play in protecting individuals against government;"00 and (3) that state 
governments pose dangers not simply to the interests of other states 
and their citizens, as single-minded focus on diversity cases after Erie 
might suggest, but also to the constitutional rights of their own citi- 
zens.101 Virtually all of the cases cited in footnote four involve con- 
stitutional rights against one's own state. The fact that, in many 
cases, the individual possesses a virtually identical right against Con- 
gress undercuts any notion that Congress itself can be trusted to 
protect those rights adequately if allowed plenary control over federal 
jurisdiction. 
97 See J. ELY, supra note 35 (elaborating on Carolene Products); Ely, supra note 31 (elabo- 
rating on Erie). It is probably coincidental that Dean Ely was born in the same year as the 
cases he so carefully elaborated - I938. See ASS'N OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 
29, at 3I6. It is not surprising, however, that, compared to "golden age" scholarship, Dean 
Ely's legal process vision was far more influenced by Brown and the general jurisprudence of 
the Court under Chief Justice Warren - for whom Ely clerked and to whom he dedicated his 
book. Cf. Shapiro, Fathers and Sons: The Court, the Commentators, and the Search for Values, 
in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 223-25 (V. Blasi ed. I983) 
(discussing differences in outlook between those constitutional scholars born before the New 
Deal and those born after). 
98 Freund, Umpiring the Federal System, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 56i (I954). 
99 See U.S. CONST. art. I, ? 9, cl. 3; id. ? io, cl. i; see also Amar, supra note 42, at 222- 
29. 
100 See Amar, supra note 42, at 222-29, 263 & n.I8g. 
101 See id. at 208 n.9, 247 n.134; Amar, supra note 53, at I440-4I, and sources cited therein. 
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When one looks beyond the case law to the Constitution itself, the 
Carolene Products-Brown102 vision is only strengthened. The Recon- 
struction amendments were hardly premised on any myth of parity 
between federal and state courts in protecting individual rights against 
the states. Nor were federal courts enforcing these amendments seen 
as simply servants of Congress; indeed, one of the most important 
consequences of dividing early unitary draft language of the fourteenth 
amendment into a self-executing section one and a congressionally 
empowering section five was to allow federal courts to police state 
compliance even in the absence of congressional support. 103 
But the Carolene Products-Brown vision has even deeper roots 
than the Reconstruction. One of the Federalists' most important goals 
in the I780's was to forge a strong set of rights that individuals could 
assert against abuses by their own state governments, as dramatized 
by article I, section io - the Federalist forbear of the fourteenth 
amendment. 104 Federal courts were to have a unique role in enforcing 
those rights. 105 Indeed, the Philadelphia convention deliberately voted 
to commit ultimate enforcement of these rights against states to federal 
courts and not to Congress.106 The editors of the first edition failed 
to grasp the full implications of all this. For example, in their opening 
chapter, they quoted from a I787 letter by James Madison: 
The mutability of the laws of the States is found to be a serious evil. 
The injustice of them has been so frequent and so flagrant as to alarm 
the most steadfast friends of Republicanism. I am persuaded I do not 
err in saying that the evils issuing from these sources contributed more 
to that uneasiness which produced the Convention, and prepared the 
public mind for a general reform, than those which accrued to our 
national character and interest from the inadequacy of the Confeder- 
ation to its immediate objects. A reform, therefore, which does not 
make some provision for private right must be materially defective. 107 
102 For an important case decided only months after Carolene Products and placing the 
Court on the road to Brown, see Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), which 
invalidated a state policy of denying blacks admission to state law schools and paying for tuition 
at out-of-state schools. 
103 See M.K. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE 128-29 (I986). 
104 See sources cited supra notes 99-IOI. 
105 See Amar, supra note 42, at 222-29. 
106 See id. at 223 n.69, 248-50, 250 n.I46. Alexander Hamilton wrote: 
By a limited Constitution I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions 
to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, 
no ex post facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice 
no other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to 
declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. I96I). 
107 First Edition, supra note 6, at IIn. I19 (quoting 5 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 27 (G. 
Hunt ed. 1904)). The Philadelphia convention, of course, did make express "provision for 
private right" against "mutab[le]" and "[u]njust[]" state laws in article I, section io. 
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Yet they immediately follow this quotation with language that borders 
on non sequitur in suggesting that Madison did err: "But the sheer 
weakness of the Confederation was the most urgent reason for change 
.. ." (ist ed. p. ii n. 9).108 And the remainder of the passage reflects 
an image of federal courts as merely umpires of the federal system 
and servants of Congress. 
To end my discussion of the first edition with a far more dramatic 
and significant example, the original editors seriously distorted the 
position of the most important proponent of an alternative vision of 
the federal judiciary. Joseph Story was undoubtedly one of the most 
important Associate Justices ever to sit on the Supreme Court - 
many would argue the most important. His opinion for the Court in 
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee109 was undoubtedly one of his most im- 
portant opinions - many would argue the most important, especially 
in the field of federal jurisdiction.'110 This opinion was later elaborated 
on in his i833 Commentaries on the Constitution,111 undoubtedly one 
of the most important post-ratification works on the Constitution 
again, many would argue the most important. 
Given the importance of this argument, it is stunning to see how 
sloppily Hart and Wechsler treated it. (Is it possible that the editors' 
devotion to Erie led them to dismiss too quickly anything penned by 
Joseph Story, the author of Swift v. Tyson?'12) Several of the most 
persuasive and powerful passages in Martin113 and the 
Commentaries114 are never quoted or even mentioned.115 The reader 
is simply never made aware of the fact that Story drew a sharp 
distinction between the two tiers of federal jurisdiction - the first 
involving "all cases" arising under federal law, "all cases" in admiralty, 
and "all cases" affecting ambassadors; the second involving "contro- 
versies" defined by party status, such as diversity jurisdiction.116 
108 But see G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, I776-1787, at 463-67 
(i969) (stating that the most urgent reason for change in the minds of leading Federalists was 
dissatisfaction with internal government within individual states, just as Madison suggested). 
109 I4 U.S. (i Wheat.) 304 (i8i6). 
110 The other major candidate is Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (i6 Pet.) I (i842). 
111 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (L. Levy 
ed. 1970). 
112 41 U.S. (I6 Pet.) I (I842); cf. First Edition, supra note 6, at 6i6 n.i (quoting Gray's ad 
hominem attack on Story in a note following Swift). 
113 See I4 U.S. (i Wheat.) at 333-36, 347. 
114 See, e.g., 3 J. STORY, supra note iii, ? i696, at 572 ("[It] is clear, from the language of 
the constitution, that, in one form or the other, it is absolutely obligatory upon congress, to vest 
all the jurisdiction in the national courts, in that class of cases at least, where it has declared, 
that it shall extend to 'all cases."' (emphasis in original)). 
115 The original editors' crabbed treatment of Martin's discussion of the mandatory nature 
of federal jurisdiction is especially anomalous in light of their "general . . . practice of printing 
leading cases in their entirety" (p. xxi). 
116 See Amar, supra note 42, at 210-19. 
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Story argued that all cases in the first tier must fall within the original 
or appellate jurisdiction of the federal judiciary; Congress could decide 
which article III court could hear a given first-tier case, but it could 
not oust all federal jurisdiction over the case. In the second tier, by 
contrast, Story implied that Congress enjoyed plenary power to strip 
all federal courts of jurisdiction and thereby give state courts the last 
word. Admittedly, these passages are in some tension with other 
things that Story said, which Hart and Wechsler quote and persua- 
sively pounce on (ist ed. pp. 292-94). But surely the reader is entitled 
to see Story's best arguments in addition to his weakest ones.117 
To recap: despite the depth, breadth, and brilliance of the first 
edition, its image of federal courts was deeply problematic, to say the 
least. The original editors' vision of federalism, separation of powers, 
and "cases and controversies" was in serious tension with the legal 
topography circa I954, with some elements present from the very 
beginning of the legal process tradition in I938, and with the text, 
history, and structure of both the Federalist Constitution and the 
Republican Reconstruction. 
E. Revisions: I973 
The problems of the first edition's vision of federal courts became 
even more acute with the passage of time. Gordon Wood's pathbreak- 
ing I969 book, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-I787,118 
suggested a serious need to rethink the historical account of the Fed- 
eralist Constitution on which the first edition implicitly relied; and a 
series of landmark Supreme Court cases - Monroe v. Pape,119 Baker 
v. Carr,120 Townsend v. Sain,121 Fay v. Noia,122 Henry v. Missis- 
sippi,123 Dombrowski v. Pftster,124 Flast v. Cohen,125 and Bivens v. 
Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,126 
to name just a few - similarly challenged Hart & Wechsler's descrip- 
tive and normative account of the modern role of the federal judiciary. 
117 The editors compound the injustice to Story by quoting another Story opinion somewhat 
out of context in order to imply more political motivation on his part than may well have 
existed. Compare First Edition, supra note 6, at 294 (arguing that White v. Fenner, 29 F. Cas. 
IOI5 (C.C.R.I. i8i8) (No. 17,547), "indicates that [Story] did not consider the constitutional 
imperative to be self-executing") with Amar, supra note 42, at 257 n.i68 (arguing that White 
indicates only that Story did not believe that lower federal court jurisdiction was self-executing). 
118 G. WOOD, supra note io8. 
119 365 U.S. I67 (I96I). 
120 369 U.S. i86 (I962). 
121 372 U.S. 293 (I963). 
122 372 U.S. 39I (I963). 
123 379 U.S. 443 (I965). 
124 380 U.S. 479 (I965). 
125 392 U.S. 83 (I968). 
126 403 U.S. 388 (I97I)- 
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The casebook's initial response to these events was disappointing 
for twenty years there was silence;127 then, in I973 (exactly thirty- 
five years after Erie) there appeared a second edition of the casebook, 
which in retrospect seems like a last-ditch effort to prop up the 
increasingly problematic vision of the first edition. To be sure, new 
cases and scholarship were mentioned, but their lessons were not fully 
integrated into the book's analytic structure. Perhaps the editors felt 
that any major modification of the first edition's substantive vision 
would be faithless to the genius of the original - that anything else 
would not be Hart & Wechsler. But if such a concern lay behind the 
second edition, it was misguided. The real genius of the first edition 
- its enduring contribution to American law - lay not in its partic- 
ular substantive vision, but in its legal process methodology. Its purest 
nuggets were the basic questions it asked, and not the particular 
answers it implied. The challenge facing the editors of the third 
edition, then, was to preserve the insights and power of legal process 
analysis - "to retain the historical and analytic richness" (p. xxi) of 
the original editors - while modifying some of the specific substantive 
positions endorsed or implied by the earlier editions. 
II. THE PRESENT 
Judged by this standard, the third edition gets high marks. 128 
Indeed, so much is improved that, to echo words written thirty-five 
years ago about the first edition, "[a] modest reviewer is required to 
apologize, whatever else he says, for not praising all its fine points; 
they are too many to be listed. It is simply an extraordinary book: 
in range, in scholarship, in penetration."1129 
Some of the improvements are evident simply from side-by-side 
comparison of the tables of contents. Whereas the first edition treated 
both federal question and diversity jurisdiction in a single chapter, 
the third edition expands the material on the former and relegates the 
latter to a much later chapter - changes to be cheered by those 
followers of Justice Story who believe that the two categories of 
jurisdiction are fundamentally different as a matter not simply of 
policy, but of constitutional law. 130 
Another fine innovation is a new chapter integrating various doc- 
trinal issues related to suits against state and federal governments and 
their officials (pp. I080-307). Building on the premises of Marbury 
127 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. 
128 The second edition scores lower on this scale. In virtually every area discussed below, 
the major improvements took place between the second and third editions and not between the 
first and second. 
129 Young, Book Review, 32 TEX. L. REv. 483 (I954). 
130 See Amar, supra note 42, at 240-54. 
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v. Madisonl3l itself a suit seeking affirmative relief against a federal 
official despite the absence of an obvious violation of common law 
rights -the Supreme Court in this century has read the Constitution 
as creating self-executing rights of action against government officials 
for both injunctive relief132 and damages.133 In I954, Henry Hart 
expressed doubt about such developments because they seemed to 
leapfrog what he saw as the traditional eighteenth- and nineteenth- 
century requirement that even unconstitutional government action 
must infringe upon a common law or statutory right before a well- 
framed case or controversy could be made out.134 Similarly, as has 
already been mentioned, Hart questioned whether affirmative relief 
against state governments was consistent with the eleventh amend- 
ment.135 By contrast, Professors Shapiro and Meltzer, two of the 
editors of the third edition, have been rather critical of several of the 
assumptions underlying Hart's analysis - assumptions about the 
structure of federalism, the meaning of the eleventh amendment, the 
essential nature of "cases and controversies," and the need for strict 
distinctions between "affirmative" and "negative" remedies.136 Per- 
haps because of the healthy dialectical tension between the views of 
an original editor and those of later ones, the new chapter succeeds 
in presenting a balanced and thoughtful analysis of the many issues 
implicated in this rapidly changing subfield.137 
131 5 U.S. (i Cranch) I37 (I803). 
132 See, e.g, Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. I23, I55-56 (I908). 
133 See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388, 395-97 (I97I). 
134 See Hart, supra note 27, at 523-24 (questioning the validity of injunctive relief based 
only on the Constitution); id. at 528 n. 144 (questioning the existence of a damage remedy based 
only on the Constitution); cf. First Edition, supra note 6, at 795 (questioning the extant case 
law's differential treatment of preventive and compensatory relief). 
135 See supra p. 705. 
136 See, e.g., Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, go HARV. L. REV. 293, 
298-99 (1976) (implicitly criticizing Hart-like assumptions about federalism); Shapiro, State 
Courts and Federal Declaratory Judgments, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 759, 779-80 (i979) (same); 
Shapiro, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term - Comment: Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment 
and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 6i, 68 (I984) (explicitly criticizing Hart-like as- 
sumptions about the eleventh amendment and sovereign immunity); Meltzer, Deterring Consti- 
tutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys 
General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 295-327 (I988) (challenging Hart-like assumptions about 
"cases and controversies" and the distinction between negative and affirmative remedies). 
Professor Shapiro arrived as a student at Harvard Law School in 1954, only months after 
Brown was decided. He subsequently served as a Note Editor on the Harvard Law Review, 
clerked for Justice Harlan, joined the Harvard Law School faculty, and became an editor of 
the second and third editions of the casebook. Before becoming an editor of the third edition, 
Professor Meltzer had served as President of the Harvard Law Review (in 1974-1975), and as 
a law clerk to Justice Stewart, and had joined the Harvard Law School faculty. 
137 Another fine example of this dialectic occurs in Chapter Five's discussion of the adequacy 
of state procedural grounds (pp. 590-638). Compare Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal 
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Improvements are also evident in many places where the new work 
follows the first edition's basic organization. Two particularly fine 
examples occur in Chapter Two's analysis of "cases and controversies." 
The first consists of a thoughtful presentation of two different, and 
admittedly stylized, conceptions of "cases and controversies" - the 
traditional "dispute resolution" model and an emerging "public action" 
model (pp. 79-82). From the very outset, the reader is alerted to a 
way of thinking about federal jurisdiction that goes beyond the as- 
sumptions of the editors of the first edition; indeed, the new editors 
explicitly invoke the "[s]chool desegregation cases" (p. 8o) and invite 
the reader to ask herself throughout the chapter "whether a significant 
change in overall conception is occurring and, if so, whether such a 
change is warranted" (p. 82).138 Several pages later, the new editors 
follow this invitation with a sensitive and sophisticated analysis of 
"the breakdown of the common-law model" (p. 12 I), "[t]he emergence 
of a new conception of constitutional rights" (p. 122), and various 
ways of conceptualizing the notion of "standing" (pp. 12I-23). 
Even more dramatic may be the way the third edition revises the 
original editors' analysis of Congress' power to restrict federal juris- 
diction. The analytic notes now begin with a section recaptioned "The 
Position of Justice Story," which presents a far more careful summary 
and analysis of his various lines of argument (pp. 366-68). A later 
section entitled "The Current Debate" (pp. 379-87) carefully disentan- 
gles issues that the first edition had tended to conflate. For example, 
the original editors had opened their chapter with a back-to-back 
presentation of Sheldon v. Sill'39 and Ex parte McCardle.140 This 
ordering of the cases might easily be read to imply that because, as 
Sheldon held, Congress has broad power to restrict lower federal court 
jurisdiction and, as McCardle held, it also has broad power to restrict 
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, it must necessarily follow 
that Congress can do both at the same time and thus leave many 
Rights, 99 HARV. L. REv. II28 (I986) (arguing that, where the underlying substantive law is 
federal, rules of waiver in state court should be governed by federal common law) with Hart, 
supra note 27, at 508 ("The general rule, bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state 
control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them.") 
and Hart, supra note 36 (making a similar argument) and Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court: Reflections on the Law and the Logistics of Direct Review, 34 WASH. & 
LEE L. REv. 1043, 1054 (1977) ("The problem of federal-state relations is the same, moreover, 
whether the antecedent state law issue is substantive or procedural. It is difficult to understand, 
therefore, why there should be a difference in the nature or the scope of the Supreme Court's 
examination of the state determinations."). 
138 A change in overall conception may well be occurring in the minds of the casebook 
editors, but it must be emphasized that "the public action" model is no upstart, as even the 
current edition at times might seem to imply. In Marbury itself, the "public action" model is 
intertwined with the "dispute resolution" model. See supra note 69. 
139 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (I850). 
140 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 5o6 (I869). 
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federal question cases to state courts for final resolution. This implied 
argument is later made explicit by the Dialogue.'4' As the third 
edition makes clear, however, even if Sheldon and McCardle are read 
"for all they are worth," it need not follow that Congress can simul- 
taneously divest both the Supreme Court and lower federal courts of 
jurisdiction over any given federal question case. Instead, as the new 
editors remind the reader, "[t]he question of the power of Congress to 
limit federal court jurisdiction is not a unitary one" (p. 379). 
The pages that follow this reminder are exemplary - not only of 
the high standard of scholarship and fairness that informs the entire 
book, but also in an even deeper sense: they establish by example 
what good legal scholarship is and can be. Cases, commentary, and 
historical material are elegantly and succinctly sumrmarized, synthe- 
sized, and analyzed. Although the editors do not shrink from posing 
hard questions about each of the current competing theories about 
jurisdiction-stripping (including, it must be said in the interest of full 
disclosure, the theory that this reviewer has propounded (pp. 385- 
87)), they never distort those theories. It is not easy to be both 
gracious and incisive, but the editors here pull off this combination 
with remarkable skill. As a result, the reader's attention is focused 
both on the strongest lines of argument that have thus far emerged 
and on those areas where much more hard thinking and research need 
to be done. 
III. THE FUTURE 
It bears repeating that there is far more superb material both 
old and new - in the third edition than any single Review could 
hope to describe and engage. The preceding remarks have focused 
particular attention on jurisdiction-stripping issues for two main rea- 
sons. First, this is an area in which I have a personal scholarly 
interest. But there is a second, deeper, and less personal reason for 
emphasizing jurisdiction-stripping. The issues it raises go to the very 
essence of one's conception of "the federal courts and the federal 
system." Federalism, separation of powers, "cases and controversies " 
all are powerfully implicated in, and illuminated by, one's position 
in the jurisdiction-stripping debate. The original editors were keenly 
aware of the centrality of the issues raised by the Dialogue. In the 
words of their preface: 
An understanding of the constitutional powers of Congress simply to 
distribute jurisdiction between state and federal courts . . . is an 
essential foundation for consideration, throughout the remainder of 
141 See First Edition, supra note 6, at 312-13, 335-38. 
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the course, of the issues of legislative and interpretive policy which 
the existence of these powers must continually pose (ist ed. p. xiii). 
Although subsequent scholars of federal jursidiction have not always 
shared the Dialogue's particular views about the scope of Congress' 
constitutional power "simply to distribute jurisdiction between state 
and federal courts," these scholars have in the main agreed with Hart 
and Wechsler about the overarching importance of the issue. Hence 
the tremendous outpouring of scholarship on the topic since I953 and 
the extraordinary attention paid to the Dialogue itself. 
These observations suggest possible lines of development that 
might be usefully considered for subsequent editions of, or supple- 
ments to, the casebook.142 One impoLtant set of issues now touched 
on by the third edition's section on jurisdiction-stripping concerns the 
parity, or lack thereof, of state and federal courts: are these courts 
fungible as a matter of either sociology or constitutional law? The 
first edition's discussion of jurisdiction-stripping did not even raise the 
question; parity was simply, and to my mind erroneously, assumed. 143 
The third edition is better on this count (pp. 384 & n.34, 386 & n.39), 
but even it fails to develop the issue with the degree of care and 
precision that are the hallmarks of the book. This failing is all the 
more significant because - as with so many aspects of the jurisdiction- 
stripping debate - the question of parity between state and federal 
courts has implications for a vast set of other doctrinal issues: absten- 
tion, the eleventh amendment, res judicata, collateral review, the so- 
called Rooker-Feldman doctrine,144 certiorari, and habeas corpus, to 
name just a few. 145 Yet I cannot recall anything more than a passing 
reference, if that, to parity in any of these other contexts; indeed, I 
cannot recall even a single citation outside the jurisdiction-stripping 
discussion to Professor Neuborne's classic article on The Myth of 
Parity. 146 
142 To be sure, the revisions made for the third edition reflect Herculean labors of many 
persons over many years. By raising the issue of still more revisions, I do not mean to deny 
the editors a well-deserved rest, but it does not seem too early to begin to think about the next 
round of editing. 
143 This assumption is built into the Dialogue's repeated and unselfconscious use of the word 
"court" - a word that obscures the obvious structural, textual, and historical differences between 
state judges and article III judges. See Amar, supra note 42, at 238 n.115. 
144 I must confess a certain degree of surprise at the current editors' description of Rooker 
v. Fidelity Trust, 263 U.S. 4I3 (1923), as a "classic" (p. xxi). 
145 For a fine analysis of how the parity issue plays out in many of these contexts, see Fallon, 
The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. II4 (I988). 
146 Neuborne, supra note 73. In the jurisdiction-stripping discussion, I can recall only a 
single - and uncharacteristically cryptic and unilluminating - reference to Professor Neuborne's 
essay (p. 384 n.34). My hedging on these points leads me to make another suggestion that is 
perhaps substantively trivial, but that would, I think, significantly improve the handiness of 
the book as a reference tool and teaching manual: future editions should include a table of 
authorities in addition to a table of cases. 
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This failure to address parity as a central theme of the third edition 
is all the more surprising when one looks at the other scholarship of 
the current editors. Their work has focused considerably more on the 
parity issue than did the scholarship of the original editors. For 
example, one of Professor Bator's most important recent contributions 
to federal courts scholarship is a thoughtful and provocative I98I 
essay responding to Professor Neuborne's article and exploring impli- 
cations of the parity issue in various doctrinal areas, including Younger 
abstention. 147 Yet, although the third edition's section on Younger 
does a splendid job of synthesizing much of the scholarship about this 
line of cases (pp. I392-405, I420 33)148 and does in fact cite to other 
portions of Professor Bator's article (p. I404), it does not mention his 
discussion of parity.149 
In sum, the importance of the parity issue, and the existence of 
two competing schools of thought on it, suggest that future editors 
should, at the very least, flag the parity question with greater care at 
the outset of the book, and invite the reader to keep it in mind 
throughout - much as the current editors have alerted the reader at 
the outset to the existence of two competing schools of thought about 
"cases and controversies." 
A second issue that could usefully be identified at the outset is 
whether the menu of "cases and controversies" listed in article III is 
unitary or two-tiered: should we treat "cases and controversies" as an 
undifferentiated unit - as Chapter Two implicitly does in its very 
title - or is it more useful and illuminating to follow the precise 
language of article III by distinguishing between, on the one hand, 
federal question, admiralty, and ambassador cases, which are all de- 
fined by subject matter, and, on the other, diversity-type controversies, 
which are all defined by party status? 
Once again, this is an issue that is centrally implicated in the 
jurisdiction-stripping debate,150 although the first edition skirted the 
147 See Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. 
REv. 605 (i98i). Professor Bator was a first year student at Harvard Law School during the 
I953-I954 year, during which his brother served as Developments Editor for Volume 67 of the 
Harvard Law Review. Two years later, Bator served as President of the Review. He subse- 
quently served as a law clerk for Justice Harlan, joined the Harvard Law School faculty, and 
became an editor of the second and third editions of the casebook. 
148 See, e.g., D. LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES (I985); Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 
YALE L.J. II03 (I977); Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Cases 
Dombrowski Forgot, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 636 (I979); Laycock, Federal Interference with State 
Prosecutions: The Need for Prospective Relief, I977 SUP. CT. REV. 193. 
149 Other editors of the third edition have also discussed the parity issue. See, e.g., Meltzer, 
supra note I37, at II36 n.28 (citing Neuborne and suggesting that there is "significant evidence 
that federal courts are generally, though by no means uniformly, more protective than state 
courts of particular federal rights"). 
150 See Amar, supra note 42, at 240-54; supra pp. 709-I0. 
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question through selective quotation of Justice Story's views. And 
once again, the third edition is much better on this score (pp. 367- 
68, 385-86) - but perhaps still more could be usefully done, given 
the considerable number of other doctrinal contexts in which the issue 
arises. For example: should ancillary and pendent party jurisdiction 
be more liberal when a federal court is exercising jurisdiction over a 
federal question case rather than a diversity controversy? Should 
abstention policy vary depending on whether a federal question case 
or a diversity controversy is before the court? Although the third 
edition poses these questions (pp. i688, I358), they might be;sharp- 
ened by reminding the reader of Justice Story's argument that cases 
and controversies were qualitatively different as a matter of consti- 
tutional law. 151 
Indeed, perhaps the very distinction between cases and controver- 
sies may shed additional light on the distinction that is prominently 
featured at the outset of the third edition: namely, the distinction 
between the "dispute resolution" and "public action" models of adju- 
dication (pp. 79-82). In an unpublished manuscript, Robert Pushaw 
argues that there are "functional differences between a 'case'- where 
a judge's law-declaring role is paramount, and a 'controversy' 
where a judge's ability as a dispute-resolver is highlighted."'152 
This line of analysis may help the reader to see old problems in 
new ways. Consider Erie v. Tompkins one final time. If the role of 
federal courts in a diversity controversy is more akin to that of an 
impartial "arbitrator," "umpire," or "mediator" than to that of a norm- 
declarer authoritatively expounding "what the law is," then why 
should federal judges create a "controversy" where none exists? 
Where, as was true in Erie, state courts of both New York and 
Pennsylvania - the home states of the respective parties - agree 
that Pennsylvania state court tort decisions should govern, why should 
a federal court arbitrating the dispute not abide by that agreement?153 
Where, on the other hand, a federal question case is before a federal 
court, a more active judicial role may be in order. Thus, the Erie 
Court went beyond dispute-resolution on the federal constitutional 
issues it reached out to decide, even while laying down a general rule 
that federal courts should not act as primary norm-declarers in ordi- 
151 A debate is currently raging between those who read the eleventh amendment as barring 
federal court jurisdiction over certain federal question cases, and those who see the amendment 
as simply repealing federal jurisdiction over a type of diversity controversy, thereby leaving 
intact plenary federal question jurisdiction (pp. II59-22I). In contrast to their treatment of 
pendent party jurisdiction and abstention, the editors here do a very nice job of reminding the 
reader of the possible relevance of a two-tiered view of article III to this debate (p. II69 I1. i6). 
152 R. Pushaw, Article III's Case/Controversy Distinction and the Function of Federal Courts 
(June I987) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author); cf. Amar, supra note 42, at 244 
n.I28. 
153 See Friendly, supra note 46, at 40I. 
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nary diversity controversies posing only state law questions. To the 
extent that Erie was a case it invites a rather expansive role for the 
federal judiciary; to the extent that it was a controversy, it implies a 
more limited "arbitration" role. 
The centrality of norm-declaration in federal question cases invites 
a rethinking of a host of doctrines often, but perhaps wrongly, cata- 
logued as "jurisdictional": standing,154 ripeness,155 declaratory judg- 
ments,156 mootness,157 finality,158 adequate and independent state 
154 Attention to the etymological linkages between "case" and "cause" should help to remind 
us that a properly framed case in which a plaintiff has "standing" is simply one in which she 
has a cause of action. Yet whether such a cause of action exists cannot be determined by staring 
at the words of article III; one must look outside that article to substantive constitutional, 
statutory, and common law norms. Although the current editors suggest as much (pp. I22-23, 
I73), perhaps they would be truer to this insight by putting the entire discussion of standing in 
their chapter on federal common law alongside cases like Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (i97i), and J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 
426 (i964). This would make clear that standing is primarily an issue of substantive law. 
Any legitimate interest in guaranteeing adverse presentation of issues can easily be handled 
through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For example, a judge could allow liberal partic- 
ipation by amici and appointed counsel. Prudential concerns are better addressed through 
certiorari policy than through the creation of a doctrine that applies to all federal courts (p. 87 
& n.9). 
155 Like standing, ripeness obviously turns on one's conception not of article III, but of the 
substantive interests asserted. A first amendment absolutist like Hugo Black and a balancer 
like Felix Frankfurter will predictably disagree about whether a given anticipatory challenge to 
a law allowing prior restraint in certain specified circumstances is ripe because the absolutist 
deems various facts that have not yet materialized irrelevant - prior restraint is always 
impermissible - whereas a balancer might find those facts dispositive. But this is a disagree- 
ment about the meaning of the first amendment, and not about article III. 
Similarly, the ripeness of the Does' claim in Roe v. Wade, 4IO U.S. II3 (1973), depends on 
whether the fourteenth amendment is read as only protecting a right to procure an abortion 
without government interference or as also protecting a right to engage in sex without govern- 
ment-created fear. Once again, it is unsatisfactory to treat this, as the Court did, as an article 
III question. The answer will depend on a careful analysis of the fourteenth amendment, which 
the Court nowhere even mentioned in its summary ripeness disposition. See id. at I27-29. 
156 Why should declaratory judgments be seen as posing a special "problem" (ist ed. p. I26)? 
Every damage award or permanent injunction implicitly relies on an underlying judicial de- 
claratory judgment of legal rights. Indeed, this is the difference between arbitrators, who can 
award money, and judges, who say "what the law is." It should be seen as more of a "problem" 
when judges fail to write opinions justifying their decisions with declarations of law, for the 
very word jurisdiction is "composed of JUS and DICTO, juris, dictio, or a speaking or 
pronouncing of the law." THE FEDERALIST NO. 8i, at 489 n.* (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 
I96I). Interestingly, the editors omit this section from their reprinting of THE FEDERALIST No. 
8i (pp. 26-28), and do not prominently identify norm-declaration in their definition of the 
"essential aspect of the judicial function" (p. 67). 
157 Where past injury has in fact occurred, why is a case ever deemed moot? Even if money 
damages or injunctive remedies are inappropriate, a declaratory judgment is always possible. 
(It seems this should also always be a sufficient prospective remedy to satisfy the "redressability" 
prong of standing (p. I28).) Why are pieces of paper with Presidents' pictures on them more 
obviously remedial for a past nonmonetary harm than a piece of paper signed by a judge saying 
that defendant violated plaintiff's rights? Why, then, did the Court imply that the possibility 
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grounds,159 and advisory opinions,160 to name a few. This Review is 
hardly the place to elaborate such rethinking in detail, although I 
have attempted in the footnotes to hint at possible lines of develop- 
ment in each of the above-mentioned areas. Several of these lines 
have been thoughtfully pursued in recent years by scholars and further 
development seems likely. 
This brings me to my final point: the long-term future direction of 
Hart & Wechsler cannot be predicted with perfect precision because 
that direction will be influenced by the direction of legal scholarship 
as a whole. Although I have suggested possible paths of doctrinal 
development, I cannot claim a high degree of certainty in these pre- 
dictions. I am, however, more confident in making a more general 
prediction that future editions of Hart & Wechsler will be profoundly 
influenced by the general character of legal scholarship, which the 
book has always sought to synthesize. The first edition's weaknesses 
and omissions were in large part reflective of omissions in "golden 
age" legal scholarship generally. These omissions, in turn, were in 
part due to the considerable inbreeding within legal process circles. 
(Consider, for example, the intricate web of connections among Bran- 
deis, Frankfurter, Hart, Wechsler, Sacks, Freund, Kurland, Hill, and 
Mishkin.)161 If the third edition is better in many respects, it is 
of a back pay award might be necessary to avoid mootness in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 
486, 495-500 (i969)? Even if one insists on thinking in crass economic terms, Adam Clayton 
Powell would no doubt have been willing to pay for a declaratory judgment in his favor, and 
the defendants would probably have been willing to pay to avoid such a judgment. Under this 
view, the only properly moot case is one in which a properly ripe anticipatory challenge is 
brought, and subsequent events make clear that the challenged conduct is unlikely ever to 
materialize. The third edition presents just such a hypothetical (p. 8i). Apart from this scenario, 
mootness is not generally symmetrical to ripeness. In an unripe case, conduct challenged as 
illegal may never occur; in a moot case, it already has (with the one qualification just noted). 
158 What does finality have to do with the proper exercise of judicial power? Lower court 
opinions have always been subject to review by higher courts, but does their obvious lack of 
finality render these opinions problematic? And if the real issue is the possibility not of judicial 
revision, but of legislative or executive revision occasioned by possible refusal to appropriate 
money or enforce injunctive relief, is not judicial entry of a declaratory judgment itself a final 
judgment on the law immune from revision by other branches? 
159 Even if an independent and adequate state law prevents the Supreme Court from entering 
a coercive remedy on behalf of a petitioner, why is the Court jurisdictionally precluded from 
declaring whether the petitioner's federal rights were violated? Of course, even if jurisdictional 
authority to furnish such a remedy exists, equitable discretion and considerations of resource 
allocation may generally counsel against exercise of that authority. 
160 The prohibition against "advisory opinions" should mean only that federal courts should 
not give advice about wise policy, but should confine themselves to legal judgments. Properly 
understood, the advisory opinion doctrine is rather similar to the political question doctrine as 
defined by Professor Wechsler (pp. 293-94). Both should rest only on a finding that the 
Constitution has committed a policy decision to another branch of government; neither should 
operate to prevent federal courts from saying "what the law is." 
161 See supra notes 7-8, i6, 26, 52 & 7I. 
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because legal scholarship since I 953 has illuminated some issues ob- 
scured during the "golden age." 
The story of The Federal Courts and the Federal System has thus 
been inextricably intertwined with the story of American legal schol- 
arship as a whole. And that story, in turn, has been in part the story 
of intergenerational tension - the story of the great difficulty with 
which one generation is able to see the world as it will appear to the 
next. 162 
What can you say with certainty about what the next chapter of 
this law story will hold?'63 
162 Cf. E. SEGAL, LOVE STORY (I970) (depicting intergenerational tension at, inter alia, 
Harvard). 
163 How else could one fittingly end (or begin) a discussion of Hart & Wechsler, but with a 
question? 
